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This study on war crises offers an operational index of complexity
and spells out four postulates relating issue and structure elements
to war outcomes. We expect that wars over territorial issues will end
in an accommodative manner (postulate 1); that ethnic wars, though
rare, will end in a non-accommodative outcome (postulate 2); and
that clash of civilization issues, more than all other issues, will end
in a non-accommodative way (postulate 3). Finally, wars with over-
all low complexity will end in accommodation while high complexi-
ty wars will not (postulate 4). Using ICB data, this study of 55 war
crises, from 1946 to 2002, compares two situations:  Intra-War
Crisis (IWC), namely, long ongoing wars that are waged before the
crisis begins (17 cases) and regular wars that occur after the crisis
starts (38 cases). Findings from the study indicate that not all wars
are alike. The substance of issues involved in the confrontation mat-
ters and complexity affects accommodation. Overall complexity is
coupled, in part, with outcomes and, as anticipated, patterns of reg-
ular wars and IWCs vary. These findings on war diversity highlight
the need for a comprehensive ‘multi path’ model to war.
INTRODUCTION
Wars have been of core interest since time immemorial. From Thucydides
via Quincy Wright and Lewis F. Richardson to current International Relations
(IR) scholars, the puzzle of war and the horrors of its reality have captured both
mind and heart.1 This study highlights war diversity by focusing on the rela-
tionship between the complexity of war and outcomes. 
A war crisis, the unit of analysis for this study, is an international crisis that
encompasses a war between some or all of the state adversaries. We follow the def-
inition of the ICB project and focus on a situation at the system level which accord-
ing to Michael Brecher and Hemda Ben-Yehuda, occurs when there is a change in
type and/or an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions between two or
more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities that destabilize
their relationship and challenge the structure of an international system.2
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This choice of highlighting war crises, not wars alone, as the basis for our
study is designed to maximize diversity, time, and space when analyzing wars. A
war crisis, more than just the war duration itself, captures the entire process of
escalation to war and its de-escalation. It involves a long time span and subsumes
a broad range of topics that indicate the complexity of war. It also involves
greater variation in participating adversaries. The concept of a war crisis includes
multiple contenders in addition to the leading dyad — the core states involved in
the war — who affect the confrontation in diplomatic and other ways. Among
these are superpowers, Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), and regional
IGOs who play an important part in war crises. Moreover, it enables us to use cri-
sis data that is expected to add validity to existing findings on war diversity
derived from the Correlates of War (COW)/Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID)
data and thereby enhance the accumulation of knowledge in international rela-
tions.3
Are All Wars Alike?
John A. Vasquez and Brandon Valeriano argued that not all wars are the
same and claimed that in order to construct a general theory of war one must first
accept the premise that certain classes of war have causes that differ from other
types of war.4 Explanations of war should therefore be specific to certain war
domains. This basic premise is the starting point for our analysis of complexity,
a core concept we propose in order to highlight war diversity. It involves two
dimensions: issue and structure. Together they indicate overall complexity — an
index that measures turmoil during wars. Issue consists of two indicators: sub-
stance and scope of complexity; while structure, describing the type and power
rank of war crisis adversaries, combines four indicators: crisis actors, super-pow-
ers, IGOs, and regional IGOs. All six components of the complexity index are
detailed in the framework section and applied to the 55 war crises that are the
topic of this study.  
The identification of core issues in war crises is based on three approach-
es to the study of conflict, crisis, and war: territoriality, ethnicity, and clash of
civilizations (COC). Territoriality and ethnicity studies have drawn considerable
and consistent research efforts, a major body of academic literature, diversity in
methodologies and databases used for testing the frameworks and models,
important findings, as well as remarkable theoretical consolidation. The COC
thesis emerged as a paradigmatic challenge for the post-Cold War era but still
remains questionable regarding its academic contribution to the explanation of
war and peace in world politics.  
Territory
In the domain of territory the main contenders debate over the importance
of land as a major issue affecting the dynamics of international relations or the
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impact of geographical contingency affecting the choices and behavior of near
and distant adversaries.5
The relationship between territory and violence is explained by three
groups of studies: proximity, interactions, and issues.6 Though territory is com-
mon to all, the reasoning they offer to this relationship as well as the value of
their explanations differs.7 The most relevant for the present study is the third
group — studies on territoriality as a core issue that explains state resort to vio-
lence. It emphasizes the substance of issues and their importance as the ‘bones
of contention’ during the confrontation.8 Paul Huth clarifies the nature of territo-
ry as an issue involving a disagreement over the borders or the sovereignty of a
homeland/colonial territory.9 Other issues, non-territorial in essence, include
commerce/navigation, protecting nationals, commercial, religious, ethnic, ideo-
logical, liberation interests, or defending an ally, enforcing treaty terms, and
maintaining/restoring/changing the balance of power. The presence of such
issues is important because they illustrate that territoriality is not being so broad-
ly defined so as to include every possible issue that might lead to the outbreak of
war.10
Territorial issues are a major part of realist/interstate struggles. But other
non-realist issues also exist. These are captured by looking at ethnicity in world
politics and focusing on ethnic actors and issues in international crises.11
Ethnicity
While most studies on territoriality focus on realist-interstate struggles,
ethnicity studies depart from the state-centric outlook and investigate the sub-
state domain. The role of ‘ethnic diversity’ and its impact on violent disputes in
world politics has been dealt with in the ethnicity-crisis-conflict literature. Many
studies elaborated on the distinction between secessionist and irredentist con-
frontations as the core types of ethnic conflict.12 In these studies scholars probe
the links between domestic ethnic unrest and violence (intra and interstate) but
relatively little attention is devoted to ethnic actors and their de-stabilizing
impact on world politics. When the activity of ethnic actors was addressed, sev-
eral ethnic specific issues were identified as the core topics of rivalry: cross-bor-
der turmoil, ethnic kinship/minority ties, terror, de-colonization struggle, and
civil war. The most salient among these issues was regarded as the primary issue
in any given confrontation.13
On the whole, ethnicity, like territoriality, is a research field with in-depth
studies and converging findings though its theoretical consolidation still does not
reach that which characterizes the study of territoriality.14 Only the “clash of civ-
ilizations” thesis, which was proposed by Samuel Huntington as the paradigm
that will reign in the post-Cold War years, remains unsupported by most studies
so far.15
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Clash of Civilizations (COC)
COC fault lines were introduced by Huntington as a new zone of turmoil
that would replace Cold War rivalries of the post-World War II era.16 Religious,
cultural, and social identities would embody the issues of confrontation and
shape the formation of alliances as well as the definition of adversaries within
and between civilizations. Wars, reflecting issues within (intra-civilization) or
between (inter) civilizations, were expected to vary in frequency and intensity. 
Though the logic of the COC thesis seems compelling and the events of 11
September 2001 fit well into its predictions, the core concept of civilization is
still far from being defined in operational terms. Consequently, systematic
research and comprehensive findings that support this theory, across time and
region, are still lacking. But the conflicting arguments in support and against the
theory continue to circulate in political and academic circles. Moreover, the real-
ities in international relations seem to be unfolding along the predictions of this
theory so we chose to integrate COC issues into our analysis of war complexity
in order to assess the theory’s contribution in the field of war studies.
Issues, however, are not the sole element shaping complexity. Structure,
too, must be taken into account. Systems theory in international relations articu-
lates a simple but comprehensive link: structure affects process.17 Though the
role of structure as the single most important variable explaining escalation and
de-escalation in world politics has been widely debated, structure remains a core
element in many leading theories.18 It is also the distinguishing element between
simple and complex wars in the typology suggested by Vasquez and Valeriano.19
Building upon the early study of Lewis Richardson, they define a dyadic war as
a typical war in international relations, a war with one state on each side.20 They
argue that this type of war should be the simplest to explain, especially from a
historical point of view, and suggest that one should first try to explain the sim-
plest wars and then move to the more complex confrontations. 
Framework
We now outline the variables, overall complexity index, and four postu-
lates that guide this study, keeping in mind that these variables indicate war com-
plexity and are designed to highlight the diversity of war in world politics.
The Outcomes of War Crises
Wars vary in their onset, process, and outcomes. To highlight war diversi-
ty we chose to focus on how wars end; that is, on the mode in which the strug-
gle is resolved at the termination of the crisis. War outcomes are affected by the
patterns of interaction during the war and in turn these dynamics affect the
prospects of conflict escalation/winding down, long after the war ends. As such,
we regard war termination as a core topic of investigation. 
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In probing the outcomes of war crises we start with the ICB variable
FOROUT and classify its values into accommodative and non-accommodative
outcomes:21 the former involve crises that end with 1. a formal agreement; 2. a
semi-formal agreement; 3. a tacit understanding; while the latter involve cases
that end with 4. a unilateral act (by the adversaries or other parties); 5. an
imposed agreement; or 6. a crisis that fades over time with no conclusive out-
come.22 By accommodative outcomes we mean that some compromise was
reached at the end of the crisis. Non-accommodative outcomes indicate that the
crisis ended and the parties were not able or willing to reach an understanding or
a compromise regarding the issues at stake in their confrontation.
War Complexity: Variables and Index
To measure complexity we use ICB variables and ICB-related variables
described below. These variables, values, and complexity range are summarized
in Table 1. War complexity integrates two dimensions: issue and structure. Issue
complexity relates to the issues at stake during a struggle and consists of two indi-
cators: substance and scope of issues fought over during a war crisis. Structure
complexity relates to the diversity in war adversaries, their type, and power rank.
It encompasses four indicators: number of crisis actors involved, superpower
involvement, IGO participation, and regional organization activity. Each of these
indicators contributes to the overall war complexity as they indicate the extent of
turmoil that occurs during the confrontation.23
Issue substance identifies the issues involved in each war crisis. We cap-
ture issue substance by comparing classical interstate wars over a territorial
issue, which are in essence confrontations at the heart and core of realism, with
wars involving an ethnic issue, that involve non-state actors in a confrontation
with states, not merely the existence of ethnic diversity. Such struggles may
include not only civil wars and low-intensity conflicts but also confrontations
that escalate into a full-scale interstate war. Finally, we also refer to the COC
issue, which adds to complexity by highlighting fundamental religious-cultural
gaps, misunderstanding, and rivalry between adversaries in opposing camps.24
Once the presence of territory, ethnicity, and COC issues is ascertained for
each war, its issue substance is assigned. Value 1 is for cases where none of the
three issues is found. Values 2 to 5 are for one issue only (ethnic, COC, and ter-
ritory respectively). Values 4 to 6 are for cases with two issues (territory-civi-
lization, territory-ethnic, and COC-ethnic respectively). Value 7 is for cases
where all three issues are present. This variable is used to describe the trends of
accommodation when different issues are involved in war crises (postulates 1-3). 
Issue complexity takes the number of issues into account and identifies four
levels of complexity: 1. none; 2. minimal (one of three issues); 3. major (two of
three issues); and 4. full (all three issues).  It is used in postulate 4 to investigate
the dynamics of accommodation when higher complexity exists in a war crisis.
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For issue complexity we build upon previously coded variables. For terri-
tory we use type of rivalry which is based on ICB coding for territoriality. Its val-
ues are: 1. territory-dominant; 2. territory-driven; 3. territory related; and 4. non-
territorial rivalry. Values 1 to 3 involve a territorial issue while value 4 indicates
a non-territorial struggle. Second, for stakes, the shorter term and more specific
core topics in the confrontation, the gravity variable in the ICB dataset at the sys-
tem level was used. Unlike gravity of value at the actor level that focuses on the
perceptions, at the system level this variable identifies the core topic in the strug-
gle. System level gravity includes seven stakes: existence, grave damage, terri-
tory, influence, political regime, economic, and limited military damage. A cate-
gory of ‘other’ is also listed to accommodate unique stakes, all of which are non-
territorial in nature.25 For the issue of ethnicity we use crisis type which identi-
fies wars that occur in interstate-ethnic crises by using ethnic issue which
denotes five ethnic specific issues: cross-border turmoil, ethnic kinship/minority
Table 1: Complexity — Variables and Range




value 0-1 1-2 None None None
complexity
range 1 to 2 1 1 1 1
Major overall
complexity




range 3 2 2 2-4 2-4
High overall
complexity
value 3 6 and 2 Full Full
more
complexity
range 4 3 3 5 5
2008
116
ties, terror, de-colonization struggle, and civil war. The most salient among these
issues is coded as the primary issue in the confrontation.26 In an ethnic-state cri-
sis, state adversaries along with ethnic actors participate in the confrontation. An
ethnic issue is coded in a crisis only when a non-state actor takes part in the
struggle alongside states, thereby adding to the complexity of the confrontation.
From this outlook, ethnicity does not mean ethnic diversity but rather the
involvement of an ethnic actor, the issues it sets on the agenda, and the turmoil
that follows its activities. For the issue of COC we use type of civilization con-
frontation that distinguishes between inter-civilization and intra-civilization con-
frontations.27 The adversaries are classified into either the same civilization or
different ones. The definition of a civilization follows the original formulation
proposed by Huntington.28 The actual coding of particular adversary states to the
different civilizations is based on previous studies that tested the COC thesis.29
Civilizations are a much broader concept than ethnicity and a COC issue can be
found in a struggle between state adversaries alone, while an ethnic non-state
actor must be involved when an ethnic issue is coded. An additional category,
other issues, covers cases that do not belong to the three issues mentioned above.
These cases are designated as low issue complexity (0 complexity score). In
future research these “other” issues should be investigated and added to the list
of issues that contribute to complexity.30 Some of these issues, such as regime
and policy, already appear in COW and are addressed by Vasquez and
Valeriano.31
Structure refers to the actors and the distribution of power between them
(polarity). When we designate structure complexity, we focus on the number and
type of actors involved and in their power rank. Unlike the dyadic nature of many
war studies, ICB recognizes that wars involve multiple actors: states of diverse
power rank and international organizations. To describe structure complexity we
build upon ICB variables that focus on the participants in the confrontation: cri-
sis actors (CRACTR); superpowers (hereby SPs), which include the US and
USSR/Russia (USACTOR and SUACTOR); international organizations (here-
after IGOs), which focuses on United Nations activity (GLOBORG and
GLOBEFAC); and regional IGOs (REGORG and ROEFAC). When information
is missing in ICB data on these variables we supplement them with information
from ICB variables: GLOBORG, GLOBACTM, REGBODY, and REGACTMB.
For the number of state adversaries we identify three values: 1. low (one
to two actors);  2. major (three to five actors); and 3. full (six and more actors).  
To account for power rank we look at superpower complexity in crisis. We
identify three values: 1. none (no SP active as crisis actor); 2. low (one SP); and
3. full (both SPs). To account for type of actors involved we define four levels of
structural complexity integrating the identity of the organization involved and
the nature of its involvement in the wars crisis: 1. none; 2. minimal; 3. low; 4.
major; and 5. full structural complexity.
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Overall Complexity
The index of overall complexity, outlined in Table 1, integrates issue and
structure complexity. The overall complexity score for each war is derived by
adding the complexity score for each of the components leading to a theoretical
overall range from a score of 2 to 20, with none to one issue and one to two
actors, to maximal — with the presence of all three issues, six or more adver-
saries, two superpowers, and full IGO and regional organization involvement.
Our findings reveal that in reality, the overall scores for the 55 wars in this study
range from 7 to 18.32 The analysis of overall complexity is based on three levels
within this range: 1. low (overall scores of 5-9); 2. mid-level (overall scores of
10-15); and 3. high (overall scores of 16 or more). These empirically derived
thresholds are useful in presenting an index of war complexity. Future analysis
of this variable as continuous can lead to explanatory results that are beyond our
present goals.   
Expectations: Postulates and Assumptions
We follow the basic premise that Richardson highlighted and Vasquez and
Valeriano probed: simple and complex wars differ. Their outcome will therefore
also vary. Translating this starting point into postulates on war complexity and
outcome, we anticipate that:
P1. Wars over a territory issue are more likely to end in an accom-
modative outcome than wars involving all other issues.
P2. Wars over a COC issue are more likely to end in a non-accom-
modative outcome than wars involving all other issues.
P3. An ethnic issue will rarely escalate to full-scale war, but when it
does, the war will most likely end in a non-accommodative outcome.
P4: War crises with higher complexity — in terms of issue, structure,
and overall complexity — are more likely to end with non-accom-
modative outcomes than cases with lower complexity.
These postulates are based on assumptions related to two core aspects that affect
outcomes: the importance of reaching a compromise and the difficulty in con-
cluding an agreement at the end of a war.33 These two aspects operate in con-
junction with the type of issue involved and the complexity of the case, thereby
leading to our assessments regarding the extent of accommodation in postulates
1-4. 
The issue-specific postulates (P1-P3) relate to the three approaches from
which they are derived. In the case of territorial wars simple (dyadic) wars tend
to involve core yet tangible stakes. The conflict over territory as a core interest
often leads to war but unlike religion and fundamental beliefs territory can be
divided. Hence, it is therefore reasonable to expect some accommodation at the
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end of a territorial struggle, even if only as a result of power politics that shape
the extent of compromise. Territorial wars may involve an extended alliance
structure and many adversaries but often involve two neighbor states. By con-
trast, COC wars are stipulated to be the harshest confrontations involving the
most fundamental and non-tangible stakes and complex structures. As
Huntington presents it, civilizations are a totality, the “biggest ‘we’ within which
we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other ‘thems’ out
there.”34 All these elements, together, create the strong and rigid civilization
alliances, adversarial blocs, and coalitions that fight one another. Compromise in
these wars is unlikely due to the zero-sum game between rival civilizations, their
competing values, and clashing norms. The structural difficulty of concluding a
multi-state war in an agreement that will satisfy all parties adds to the lower
chances of concluding such a confrontation in any type of agreement.
The case of ethnicity, as an issue in war, is more complex because ethnic-
ity is most often related to civil wars and low-intensity conflicts.  Consequently,
our third postulate claims that ethnic confrontations that escalate to full-scale war
are relatively rare and have a logic that is separate from other wars. When inter-
state and sub-state elements are intertwined, ethnic actors are involved alongside
state adversaries and low-intensity conflict/civil war usually precedes the escala-
tion to full-scale interstate war. Compromise in such cases is rare because the lin-
gering nature of low-intensity violence subjects ceasefire agreements and pro-
posed settlements to a test of endurance. Central government control and outside
support, two vital elements for consolidating an accord in such cases, are often
lacking. Moreover, when ethnic actors place their demands at the negotiation
table, it is hard to satisfy the core adversaries who often de-legitimize one anoth-
er. The end result is that wars over ethnic issues are concluded with a non-accom-
modative outcome.35
With respect to overall complexity, involving not only issues but structure
too, we assert that in low complexity wars it is relatively easy, and also impor-
tant, to reach a compromise. When the interests at stake lead to war but only a
few actors of similar rank and type are involved, compromise can be outlined,
negotiated, and monitored. In high complexity wars involving many actors with
diversity in power and type, though compromise is essential in order to re-estab-
lish order and stability, it is quite difficult to reach and maintain. Even the super-
powers and IGOs/regional IGOs, who participate as mediators in such cases,
often fail to resolve the confrontation. Hence we anticipate that the higher the
complexity of war, the less likely is an accommodative outcome. 
Our postulates relate to regular war crises in which the crisis begins before
the war erupts.36 We also add IWCs, where a long ongoing war is waged before
the crisis begins, as a control group. Such situations involve major escalations
and defeats that take place during an ongoing war that indicate a transition in the
conflict setting and the onset of a war crisis.37 During IWCs the role of violence
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and animosity is paramount, not only throughout the crisis but also before it
starts and at times even after it ends. As such, these cases are a distinct subset of
wars that might be said to epitomize the logic of war or, by contrast, embody the
cycle of primordial hostility and enduring confrontation. We explore both groups
of wars to check the correspondence between issue/structure complexity and out-
comes.  We expect to find diversity in war patterns and anticipate that the logic
of our postulates will be relevant to regular war crises while other trends will be
found in IWCs, reflecting the overwhelming role of violence and animosity that
exist before the crisis even starts.38
Findings
The study of 55 war crises over the period from 1946 to 2002, derived from
the ICB dataset, is designed to explore whether or not variations in war com-
plexity are coupled with differences in accommodation at the end of the con-
frontation (see Appendix 1). We first probe issues in terms of substance and com-
plexity; second, we investigate structure complexity; and third, we conclude with
an analysis of overall complexity and outcomes in war crises.
Issue Complexity and War
Do regular wars and IWCs differ in terms of the issues they involve? Are
distinct issues coupled with accommodation or non-accommodation? We address
these queries by analyzing the substance and complexity of the issues. 
Findings on issues and outcomes in regular wars and IWCs, our control
group, are presented in Table 2. Among the 55 war crises we probe, 69 percent
of the wars (38 cases) are regular wars and 31 percent of them (17 cases) are
IWCs.  What characterizes wars in terms of their core issue? How are issues clus-
tered to create issue complexity in wars? Does high-issue complexity couple
with non-accommodative outcomes? 
When only one issue is present in a war crisis, issue complexity is low and
different levels of accommodation are coupled with various issues depending on
the substance, supporting postulates 1 to 3 regarding regular wars and only part-
ly so with respect to IWCs. 
In regular wars most crises involving territoriality tend to end in accom-
modation (75 percent), supporting postulate 1; all the cases with a COC issue end
in non-accommodation, supporting postulate 2; and, since most international
wars between 1946 and 2002 do not involve ethnicity at all, evidently ethnicity
is not a central issue when interstate wars are concerned.39 How do the few wars
that involve ethnic issues end?  Some ethnic wars are coupled with accommoda-
tion but findings indicate that ethnicity does not appear alone as a single issue.40
Rather it is often coupled with one or two more issues that in conjunction with
ethnicity are resolved mostly in a non-accommodative mode, thereby supporting
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postulate 3. When ethnicity is coupled with a COC issue, most cases end in a
non-accommodative outcome (62.5 percent) and when territoriality and ethnici-
ty are evident non-accommodation follows.41 More specifically, when two issues
are involved, in regular wars most cases end in non-accommodation but when
either territoriality or ethnicity are coupled with a COC issue some accommoda-
tion exists, unlike the total non-accommodation which is found when only a
COC issue is present. Hence, in the territoriality-COC group, 33 percent of the
crises end in accommodation while 67 percent do not, and in the COC-ethnicity
group 37.5 percent of the cases end in accommodation while 62.5 percent do not.
A COC is therefore not a good sign when accommodation in war is a desirable
ending. When all three issues are present the trend reverses itself in favor of an
accommodative outcome in 71 percent of all regular wars, while only 29 percent
of the cases end in non-accommodation. Accommodation is therefore most like-
ly when territoriality is at stake or when all three issues are involved, that is,
when issue complexity is high.
Turning to our control group of IWCs, long wars where violence is pro-
tracted in nature and precedes the outbreak of the crisis, mixed trends are found
and the extent of accommodation is low in all issues except for the group of
“other” issues.42 Most of the wars with a COC issue end in non-accommodation
Table 2: Issue Substance and Outcomes
Issues Accommodative Non-
accommodative
N % N %
Non- None of the three issues 1 33% 2 67%
IWC COC only - - 6 100%
Territory only 3 75% 1 25%
Territory and COC 3 33% 6 67%
Territory and ethnicity - - 1 100%
COC and ethnicity 3 37.5% 5 62.5%
All three issues 5 71% 2 29%
Total 15 39.5% 23 60.5%
IWC None of the three issues 3 100% - -
COC only 1 33% 2 67%
Territory only 2 50% 2 50%
Territory and COC 2 40% 3 60%
All three issues 1 50% 1 50%
Total 9 53% 8 47%
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(67 percent) and even in long wars with a territorial issue or containing all three
issues the chances of accommodation/non-accommodation are even (50:50),
though these cases involve a slightly better prospect in terms of compromise and
conflict resolution than cases with a COC issue alone.
When we compare regular wars and IWCs we find that quite the same
trends exist with respect to COC alone and to territory coupled with COC. In the
case of a COC issue all regular wars end with non-accommodation and most
IWCs do so (67 percent). When both territory and a COC issue are evident, 67
percent of the regular wars end with non-accommodation and 60 percent of the
IWCs do so. In crises with none of these three issues and with all three issues
together, the trends are quite different in regular wars and IWCs. First, in the
group where none of the three issues are involved, 67 percent of the regular wars
end in non-accommodation, while all cases in the IWC control group end in
accommodation. When all three issues are involved and issue complexity is high,
71 percent of the regular wars but only 50 percent in the IWC group end in
accommodation. What do these findings indicate in terms of low- and high-issue
complexity and war outcomes?
Findings on issue complexity are presented in Table 3 in terms of a scale
ranging from none, via minimal and major, to full-issue complexity. These find-
ings lead us to reject our theoretical expectation spelled out in postulate 4 on
issue complexity regarding regular wars and to accept it partly regarding the con-
trol group of IWCs. When full-issue complexity is evident the prospects of
accommodation are high in regular wars and drops considerably in IWCs.
Table 3: Issue Complexity and Outcomes
Issues complexity Accommodative Non-
accommodative
N % N %
Non-IWC None 1 33% 2 67%
Minimal (one only) 3 30% 7 70%
Major (two issues) 6 33% 12 67%
Full (three issues) 5 71% 2 29%
Total 15 39.5% 23 60.5%
IWC None 3 100% - -
Minimal (one only) 3 43% 4 57%
Major (two issues) 2 40% 3 60%
Full (three issues) 1 50% 1 50%
Total 9 53% 8 47%
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In regular wars accommodative outcomes are more likely than non-accom-
modative ones (71 percent) only in full-issue complexity. In the lower levels of
issue complexity involving none, minimal, and major complexity, most of the
crises end in a non-accommodative ending. Only some 30 percent of the cases
are accommodative in nature.
When we turn to long wars in the IWCs control group this trend disap-
pears. A rather close level of non-accommodation appears in all three complexi-
ty levels, with 57 percent for minimal complexity, 60 percent for major, and a
drop to 50 percent non-accommodation for full-issue complexity.  By contrast,
as noted earlier, all cases where the issues we analyze are not evident at all are
resolved in accommodation.
Structure Complexity and War
The type and power of adversaries also indicate war complexity. Hence,
we probe actors, superpower involvement, and the participation of IGOs/region-
al IGOs as indicators of structure complexity. First we address each element of
structure complexity on its own and compare regular wars with our control group
of IWCs. Then we explore the correspondence between overall complexity and
outcomes, anticipating that higher complexity will be coupled with less accom-
modation in war crises.   
Crisis Actors and Outcomes
Do regular wars differ from IWCs in the extent of actor complexity? Does
high actor complexity correspond with non-accommodative outcomes as antici-
pated in postulate 4? The findings presented in Table 4 show that indeed regular
wars and IWCs differ and that postulate 4 is supported in the former but not in
the latter. 
Table 4: Structure Complexity — Actors and Outcomes
Actors Accommodative Non-
accommodative
N % N %
Non-IWC Low (1-2) 7 44% 9 56%
Major (3-5) 7 44% 9 56%
Full (6 and more) 1 17% 5 83%
Total 15 39.5% 23 60.5%
IWC Low (1-2) 2 29% 5 71%
Major (3-5) 7 70% 3 30%
Full (6 and more) - - - -
Total 9 53% 8 47%
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In regular wars both in the low and major actor complexity levels, 56 per-
cent of the cases are non-accommodative, and in the full actor complexity, with
6 and more actors involved, non-accommodation rises to 83 percent. By contrast,
in IWCs, where all cases are either of low or major actor complexity, 29 percent
of the former end in accommodation and 70 percent of the latter. Contrary to the
anticipation in postulate 4, the rise in accommodation follows the rise in actor
complexity. Hence, while in regular wars high actor complexity follows the logic
of postulate 4 that links high complexity with non-accommodation, in IWCs with
many participants the logic changes and compromise takes place. 
Superpowers and Outcomes
Do regular wars differ from IWCs in the extent of superpower complexi-
ty? Does high superpower complexity correspond with non-accommodative out-
comes as anticipated in postulate 4?
The findings presented in Table 5 support postulate 4 regarding regular
wars but not for IWCs. In regular wars we find that 52 percent of the crises with
no superpower involvement end in non-accommodation. Non-accommodation
rises to 83 percent of the cases with one superpower involved and to 80 percent
of the cases with both superpowers involved. Clearly, in these cases, as antici-
pated in postulate 4, accommodation and high superpower complexity are not
coupled. 
In the control group of IWCs a mixed trend appears: accommodation drops
from 54.5 percent to 40 percent with the rise from no superpower complexity to
one superpower only, supporting postulate 4. But accommodation rises sharply
to 100 percent when both superpowers are involved, contrary to the expectations
Table 5: Structure Complexity — Superpowers and Outcomes
Superpowers (SPs) Accommodative Non-
as war crisis actors accommodative
N % N %
Non-IWC No SP involvement 13 48% 14 52%
One SP 1 17% 5 83%
Two SPs 1 20% 4 80%
Total 15 39.5% 23 60.5%
IWC No SP involvement 6 54.5% 5 45.5%
One SP 2 40% 3 60%
Two SPs 1 100% - -
Total 9 53% 8 47%
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spelled out in postulate 4.  Once more, as in actor complexity, it seems that per-
haps the dangers of escalation or fatigue introduce some prudence and high com-
plexity is coupled with compromise at the end of the confrontation.  
IGOs and Outcomes
Do regular wars differ from IWCs in the extent of IGO complexity? Does
high IGO complexity correspond with non-accommodative outcomes as antici-
pated in postulate 4?
The findings presented in Table 6 support postulate 4 for regular wars but
not for IWCs. In regular wars, the rise of IGO complexity is coupled with a cor-
responding rise in non-accommodative outcomes as stipulated in postulate 4: 50
percent of the cases end in non-accommodation when no IGO activity exists; 60
percent, when low IGO complexity is found; 65 percent when major IGO com-
plexity exists; and 62.5 percent when full IGO complexity is present in wars.
Support for postulate 4 on this aspect of complexity points to the fact that con-
ventional wisdom regarding IGO activity is not automatic. Though IGOs are
regarded as mediators that attempt to promote conflict resolution, their role in
enhancing war complexity is often coupled with the opposite result: a non-
accommodative ending of wars.
In IWCs the trend reverses itself and with the rise in IGO complexity a cor-
responding rise in accommodation is found, thereby rejecting postulate 4 and
supporting conventional wisdom regarding IGO contribution to crisis manage-
ment and conflict abatement, despite their role of increasing structural complex-
ity. While 50 percent of the IWCs with no IGOs involved end in accommodation,
Table 6: Structure Complexity — IGOs and Outcomes
IGOs in war crises Accommodative Non-
accommodative
N % N %
Non-IWC None 4 50% 4 50%
Low 2 40% 3 60%
Major 6 35% 11 65%
Full 3 37.5% 5 62.5%
Total 15 39.5% 23 60.5%
IWC None 1 50% 1 50%
Low 3 43% 4 57%
Major 3 60% 2 40%
Full 2 67% 1 33%
Total 9 53% 8 47%
The Journal of Conflict Studies
125
43 percent of them end so when low IGO complexity exists, 60 percent when
major IGO activity is found, and 67 percent when full IGO complexity is pres-
ent.
Regional IGOs and Outcomes
Do regular wars differ from IWCs in the extent of regional IGO complex-
ity? Does high regional IGO complexity correspond with non-accommodative
outcomes as anticipated in postulate 4?
The findings presented in Table 7 do not support postulate 4 in either reg-
ular wars or IWCs. For once, non-IWCs and IWCs follow a similar logic and in
both types of war a rise in regional IGO complexity is coupled with a rise in
accommodation. This trend could lead to a refinement in the conventional wis-
dom regarding IGO roles in war crises: while both IGOs and regional IGOs add
to complexity, accommodation decreases when IGOs are involved but increases
when regional IGOs do so. This is true in regular wars and in IWCs. In more
detail, when examining regular wars: 78 percent of the cases end in non-accom-
modation with no regional IGO complexity, 60 percent when low regional IGO
complexity is found, 54 percent when major regional IGO complexity exists, and
when full regional IGO complexity is present in wars all cases are accommoda-
tive. Quite similarly, in the control group of IWCs: 40 percent of the cases end
in non-accommodation with no regional IGO complexity, 67 percent when low
regional IGO complexity is found, and when major regional IGO complexity
exists all the cases end in an accommodative manner. No cases of full regional
IGO complexity are present in IWC wars. Notably, though low regional IGO
Table 7: Structure Complexity — Regional IGOs and Outcomes
Regional IGOs in Accommodative Non-
war crises accommodative
N % N %
Non-IWC None 2 22% 7 78%
Low 6 40% 9 60%
Major 6 46% 7 54%
Full 1 100% - -
Total 15 39.5% 23 60.5%
IWC None 6 60% 4 40%
Low 2 33% 4 67%
Major 1 100% - -
Full - - - -
Total 9 53% 8 47% 
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complexity seems to hamper accommodation, with the decline in such outcomes
from 60 percent to 33 percent when a shift is made from no involvement to low
regional complexity, but in the major regional complexity all cases, are accom-
modative, pointing to the fact that though regional IGOs add to complexity, like
IGOs, their activity is coupled with accommodation more than that of IGOs. 
Overall Complexity and Outcomes
Does the overall complexity of regular wars differ from that of IWCs?
Does high complexity correspond with non-accommodative outcomes, as antic-
ipated in postulate 4? How do different types of war score on the complexity
index? Table 8 presents a summary of complexity levels and outcomes for the 55
wars we probe herein. Based upon the issue and structure indicators of com-
plexity we calculated a complexity score for each case. The analysis of com-
plexity is based on three levels within this range: 1. low (overall complexity
lower than 9); 2. mid-level (overall complexity of 10-15); and 3. high (overall
complexity of 16 or more). 
What do we learn from these scores about war complexity and outcome?
The results do not support postulate 4 for both regular wars and IWCs, though
the patterns in both groups vary. Our findings point to the conclusion that over-
all complexity tends to be coupled with accommodation but some patterns vary.
In the group of regular wars, 50 percent of the wars characterized by low com-
plexity end with non-accommodation, 64 percent in the mid-complexity range,
and 60 percent in the high complexity level.  Most accommodation is found
therefore in the low-level complexity category indicating support for postulate 4,
based on the decline from 50 percent to 36 percent accommodation which corre-
sponds with the shift from low to mid-level complexity, and a rather close 40 per-
cent at the high complexity.
Table 8: Overall Complexity Range and Outcomes
Complexity range Accommodative Non-
accommodative
N % N %
Non-IWC Low (less then 6) 4 50% 4 50%
Middle (7-9) 9 36% 16 64%
High (10 and more) 2 40% 3 60%
Total 15 39.5% 23 60.5%
IWC Low (less then 6) 2 40% 3 60%
Middle (7-9) 7 58% 5 42%
High (10 and more) - - - -
Total 9 53% 8 47%
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In the IWC group, some mixed trends are evident but the main pattern
points to a rejection of postulate 4 because non-accommodation in these cases
drops from 60 percent to 42 percent when a shift is made from low to mid-level
complexity. Accordingly, a rise in accommodation is found from 40 percent in
the low level complexity to 58 percent of the cases in mid-level complexity,
highlighting the trend that increased complexity is accompanied with more
accommodation.
CONCLUSION
Not all wars are the same. This is clear from our findings on war crises,
complexity, and outcomes. Using our variables for classifying issues, structure,
war complexity and outcomes, wars are not coded alike but patterns of com-
plexity and outcome do exist within subsets of wars. For example, in a rising
order of overall complexity score (CS): the Black September confrontation of
1970 is coded as a CS of 12 and a non-accommodative outcome; the 1982 War
in Lebanon involves a CS of 13 and an accommodative outcome; in the 1973
October War in the Middle East the CS is 15 with an accommodative outcome,
while the 2001 War in Afghanistan also has a CS of 15 and a non-accommoda-
tive outcome; the Suez War of 1956 has a CS of 16 and a non-accommodative
outcome; the 1991 Gulf war scores 18 on the CS with a non-accommodative out-
come.43 What does this mean? Our findings converge with those of earlier stud-
ies on war diversity and therefore they increase the generality of a core stipula-
tion in our field: wars vary greatly. This stipulation is now supported by evidence
on wars from 1918 (COW/MID) to 2002 (ICB) and multiple datasets (COW,
MID, ICB). In the future the emergence of a comprehensive theory of war and
peace in world politics should take the stipulation that ‘not all wars are alike’ as
its starting point. But more research on this topic is clearly needed, taking a clos-
er look at ethnicity, civil wars, political regime, culture, and other topics that
have been relatively neglected compared to the cumulative research efforts
devoted to state-centric aspects.
More specifically, what do our findings mean? Do wars vary with com-
plexity and is complexity associated with outcomes? When we combine our
results we learn that territory, COC, and ethnicity are meaningful issues in war
and that wars over these issues vary in their outcomes, mainly supporting postu-
lates 1-3 in regular wars and providing less support in the IWC control group.
Here it seems that primordial animosity, violence, and fatigue may override the
effects of issue substance. Examples occurred in Indonesia’s struggle for inde-
pendence, during the ongoing war in Yemen, throughout the Indochina con-
frontation, and during the prolonged Iran-Iraq War. Regarding postulate 4, on the
coupling of complexity and non-accommodative outcomes we found that some
issue and structure elements in non-IWCs support postulate 4 (actors, superpow-
ers, and IGOs), while others do not (issues, regional IGOs, and overall complex-
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ity). In the IWC category our control group, in which full-scale war precedes the
onset of the crisis, postulate 4 is rejected by all elements with the exception of
issue complexity that indicates some support. In summary, with the rise in com-
plexity, regular wars are less accommodative and IWCs are more accommoda-
tive. This finding introduces a somewhat more optimistic tone to the analysis of
wars: the possibility of escalation management and the prospects of conflict res-
olution in crises that occur during ongoing long wars.    
In our analysis we also found that the substance of issues as well as their
complexity is coupled with war outcomes. As outlined in postulates 1-3, the most
accommodative of all issues is territory (for examples, the 1973 October War)
and the least accommodative is COC (for example, the 2001 Afghanistan War).
The prospects of compromise in a war with a COC issue increases somewhat if
it is coupled with ethnicity or territoriality or both (for example, the 1947-48
Palestine partition/Israeli independence crisis). These trends, though much less
pronounced, are also evident in IWCs. Overall, these results, supporting the sub-
stantive aspect of issues and postulates 1-3, though not fully, demonstrate the
usefulness of using issues to indicate complexity. 
What do we learn about structure elements of complexity and war out-
comes? Structure is indicated by diversity in the number and type of participants
in war crises.  In terms of diversity in scope of actors, while in regular wars high
actor complexity follows the logic of postulate 4 that links escalation and non-
accommodation (for example, 1991 Gulf War), in IWCs with many participants
the logic changes and prudence/compromise takes place. 
When we turn to power structure and superpower involvement in regular
wars, as anticipated in postulate 4, accommodation and high superpower com-
plexity are not coupled. But in the control group of IWCs a mixed trend appears
and once more, as in actor complexity, it seems that the dangers of escalation
introduce some prudence, if not fatigue, so that high complexity is coupled with
compromise at the end of the confrontation.
Structural elements of complexity also involve diversity in type of crisis
participants. Regarding the involvement of IGOs, though these organizations are
regarded as mediators that attempt to promote conflict resolution, our findings
show that their role in enhancing war complexity is often coupled with the oppo-
site result: a non-accommodative ending of wars. However, this is not the case
with respect to regional IGOs. For once, regular wars and IWCs follow a similar
logic and in both types of war a rise in regional IGO complexity is coupled with
a rise in accommodation. This trend should lead to a refinement in the conven-
tional wisdom regarding IGO roles in war crises: while both IGOs and regional
IGOs add to complexity, accommodation decreases when IGOs are involved but
increases when regional IGOs do so. 
Do these mixed findings regarding regular wars, the majority of cases in
our study, mean that overall complexity really matters? Both the operational
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complexity index and the concept of complexity are core attributes of wars that
describe their unique characterization. Outcomes, however, are the last step in
the war process and its de-escalation dynamics. Consequently, it is not surprising
to find that outcomes do not fully correspond with complexity alone. In fact, the
diversity in wars and their outcomes is a reasonable and important finding. War
complexity should be probed further to assess its salience in explaining funda-
mental war phases, from initiation, via coping and management, to termination. 
By choosing to focus on war crises, the most hostile confrontations in
world politics, we have no a priori reason to expect that wars will end in com-
promise or that war crises will terminate in accommodation. In the event that
some accommodation patterns are found we should try to understand their
unique nature, analyze the processes they involve, and investigate how they dif-
fer from other types of wars that end without compromise. This will hopefully
enable us to manage crises in a better way and prevent future uncontrolled esca-
lation of violence to war.
Finally, one may ask: why study war in the current period of terror, civil-
ethnic driven struggles, and low-intensity conflicts? Perhaps all our efforts
should be geared to alternative research agendas that might offer new insights on
what seem to be the most threatening aspects of our existence?44 One of the
major contributions of a multi-path ‘steps to war’ model might be in helping us
grasp the big picture, even when we are confronted with the specifics of current
developments. The expansion of new research fields must not come at the
expense of a re-examination of classical topics — conflicts, crises, and wars.
The study of war in the post 9/11 era should therefore be multi-focal, as Steve
Smith claims.45 We, too, believe that a multi-focal approach is important for the
study of wars in the twenty-first century. ICB, COW, MID, and other databases,
as well as major theories in our field, are indeed state-centric in orientation. And
yet, we have to be careful not to discard all state-centric material just because it
does not always relate to the ‘other’ aspects that make up the present world. The
analysis of patterns, regularities, and transformations in the past, present, and
future arenas of world politics should take into account the fact that not all wars
are alike. Distinct issues matter and accommodation patterns are associated with
the specific issues at stake. As a result, the ‘steps to war’ cannot always be iden-
tical and a multi-faceted model should be created to explain war and peace over
time and space.
Hemda Ben-Yehuda is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science
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